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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
ABELARDO CRUZ, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Ct. App. Case No. 20140994-CA 
Dist. Ct. Case No. 131800746 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from convictions of two counts of Sodomy Upon a Child, first 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-403.1 (LexisNexis 2013), in the 
Eighth Judicial District Court, in and for Uintah County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Clark McClellan, presiding. The Supreme Court had statutory jurisdiction, see Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-l 02(3), but the case was transferred to this Court pursuant to § 78A-3-
l 02( 4). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Issues 
1) Did the admission of two Children Justice Center ("CJC") videotaped 
interviews of the child declarant pursuant to Rule 15.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure violate Defendant Abelardo Cruz's federal and state constitutional rights to 
1 
confrontation under Crawford and Villarreal, 1 where Cruz was unable to cross-examine 
the child victim for more than a year after the interview, the interviewers did not comply 
with acceptable forensic interviewing training protocol of the NICHD and, most 
vJ significantly, the videotapes were provided to the jury to be replayed at deliberation?2 
2) Did the district court commit reversible error when, at the behest of the State, 
it instructed the jury to find that the alleged child victim had nodded her head 
affirmatively when asked if she was sexually abused more than one time, even though the 
child merely gave a nonverbal cue response? 
3) Was Cruz deprived of a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment when the 
district court gave a rather coercive and unnecessary "Allen charge"3 before the 
jury indicated it was deadlocked, and the court also commanded the jury to come back 
· with a decision "in a relatively short period of time"? 
4) Was there sufficient evidence to support the two sodomy convictions where the 
State's evidence consisted of mostly uncross-examined hearsay testimony of the child-
witness and lacked any physical evidence of sexual abuse? 
5) Do cumulative evidentiary errors and counsel's ineffectiveness at trial warrant 
1 U.S. Constitution Amend. VI; Utah Constitution Art. I, 7, 12; Crawford v. Washington, 
514 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004); State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995). 
2 The National Institute of Child Health and Development (NICHD) has developed a 
comprehensive system of forensic interviewing training protocol in children abuse cases. 
See R.2:61. 
3 See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41 L. Ed. 528 (1896) (approving 
using supplemental jury instructions in deadlocked jury cases to reach unanimous 
verdict). 
2 
reversal of Cruz's convictions? 
B. Preservation of Issue and Propriety of Review 
Two of the issues raised here were properly preserved in the court below. See 
R.11 :353 (Cruz objected to introduction of CJC videotapes based on Rule 15.5); R.3 :76-
78 (Cruz objected in writing); R.386, at 17-18; R.2:49, 52, 60, 71 (Cruz objected to 
admission of ':'ideotape at preliminary hearing on hearsay grounds); R.l 1:452 (Cruz 
challenges the constitutionality of Rule 15 .5 as applied); R.11 :456 (State conceding it 
may have invited error when it requested instruction to the jury on movement of child's 
head); R.11 :494 ( district court propounding belated cautionary instruction to the jury to 
disregard its erroneous prior intervention). 
It appears, however, that former defense failed to preserve the sufficiency of the 
evidence issue at the close of the State's case-in-chief. See R.12:719 (no defense motion 
·t_o dismiss). Nevertheless, to the extent trial counsel failed to preserve the issue, this 
Court may review for plain error or for ineffectiveness of counsel. See, e.g., State v. 
Johnson, 2014 UT App 161, ,r,r14, 31,330 P.3d 743 (discussing plain error); State v. 
Low, 2008 UT 58, ~ 19, 192 P.3d 867 ("When a party fails to preserve an issue for 
appeal, we will address the issue only if ( 1) the appellant establishes that the district court 
committed plain error, (2) exceptional circumstances exist, or (3) in some situations, if 
the appellant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve the 
. issue." ( citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Similarly, defense counsel raised no wholesale objection to the district court's 
"Allen" charge. See Rl4:866-67. Nevertheless, the record does not reveal that former 
3 
counsel agreed to the court's additional instruction that it expected a response by the jury 
in a· "relatively short period of time ... " R.14: 868. Therefore, this Court may review 
counsel's deficiency for ineffectiveness or the district court for plain error. See Johnson, . 
~ 2014 UT App 161, ,rI4, 330 P.3d 743, 748. 
C. Standard of Appellate Review 
1. The constitutional and statutory violations of Cruz's confrontation rights under 
Rule 15.5 is a question oflaw reviewed de novo. See State v. Nguyen, 2012 UT App 2, 
17,271 P.3d 817; see also State v. McClellan, 2009 UT 50, ,r 17,216 P.3d 956 ("[W]e 
"° review the legal questions underlying the admissibility of evidence for correctness.").4 
2. Whether the district court committed reversible error by instructing the jury to 
assume that the child witness nodded her head affirmatively regarding if she was sexually 
abused by Cruz more than once is reviewed for plain error. State v. Toki, 2011 UT App 
293, ,Il9, 263 P.3d 481. Further, when raised for the time on appeal, "[a]n ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim ... presents a question oflaw." State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ,r 22; 
247 P.3d 344 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
4 Notably, this Court has observed that, 
Our standard of review on the admissibility of hearsay evidence is complex, 
since the determination of admissibility often contains a number of rulings, 
each of which may require a different standard of review. Legal questions 
regarding admissibility are reviewed for correctness, and questions of fact are 
reviewed for clear error. And, [f]inally, we review the district court's ruling 
on admissibility for abuse of discretion. 
State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517, 110, 153 P.3d 830 (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
4 
3. Whether the district court's Allen charge deprived Cruz of a fair trial is 
reviewed for correction of error. State v. Dalton, 2014 UT App 68, f 25, 331 P .3d 1110, 
1118; State v. Ginter, 2013 UT App 92, ,r 5,300 P.3d 1278; State v. Harry, 2008 UT App 
224, 15, 189 P.3d 98. 
4. With respect to sufficiency of the evidence, this Court is to "review the 
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn in the light most favorable to 
the verdict oqhe jury." State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 115, 63 P.3d 9. See also State v. 
Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, if29, 326 P.3d 645. To fulfill that role, this Court for years had 
required the defendant to "marshal the evidence" by presenting "in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the 
very findings the appellant resists." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 
1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ( emphasis in original). But such is no longer the case after the 
supreme court's decision in Nielsen. See 2014 UT 10, ,J9l41-46. 
5. Under the cumulative error doctrine, this Court will reverse if the cumulative of 
the errors Cruz complained of undermines the Court's confidence in a fair trial. See State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). 
D. Defendant's Custody Status 
Cruz is. currently detained at Utah State Prison. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are relevant to resolving 
this case, the relevant portion of which are reproduced verbatim in the Addenda: 
U.S. Constitution Amendment VI; 
5 
Utah Constitution Article I, § 12; 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-2-103 (2013 LexisNexis) - Culpable Mental State 
Definitions; 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-403.1 (2013 LexisNexis) - Sodomy Upon a Child; 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 52( d); 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 15.5; 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 17; 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 30; 
Utah Rules of Evidence; Rule 103(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The State charged Cruz by an Amended Information with eight felony counts: 
two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, first degree, in violation of§ 7 6-5-
404.1 [Counts I, V]; four counts of sodomy on a child, first degree, in violation of§ 76-5-
403 .1 [ Counts II, III, VI, VII]; one count of rape of a child, first degree, in violation of § 
76-5-402.1 [Count IV]; and one count of aggravated kidnapping, first degree, in violation 
of§ 76-5-302 [Count VIII]. R.1:1-5; see also R.2:5-6; R.10:89; R.13:808-811. 
The State alleged that on November 9, 2013, Ms. Yanet Arnove, the mother of 
M.R., the alleged victim and stepdaughter of Cruz, walked into the bedroom in the house 
the couple shared in Vernal, Utah, and "saw the defendant on the bed with his pants 
unbuttoned and the zipper down, and her daughter M.R., who was six years old at the 
time, there right next to him." R:10:321; see also R.12:623. M.R. allegedly told the 
6 
police at two separately recorded CJC interviews5 that Cruz had sexually assaulted her on 
several occasions.R.11:404-408, 421,501, 518-519. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
Pretrial, the State moved the district court in limine to admit the videotape of the 
second interview of M.R., pursuant to Rule 15.5. R.2:49; R.3:70. It contended that the 
second videotape should be admitted in the interest of justice and be deemed trustworthy 
and reliable "[i]n light of the child victim's young age and the gravity of the conduct 
alleged against the Defendant .... " R.3:70-75; R.3:83-85. 
Cruz opposed the State's motion. R.3:76-77, 91-92, 138-139. After a May 7, 
2014, hearing, when the district court found the second videotape admissible, R.3 83-84, 
Cruz also moved in limine for the admission of the first videotaped interview. R.3: 113-
115. The State initially opposed Cruz's motion but then conceded that the first videotape 
should be admitted for completeness. R.3:147; R.4:44-45. However, on August 27, 2014, 
Cruz objected at an evidentiary hearing to the admission of both videotapes on numerous 
grounds, including that their admission did not further the interests of justice, that it 
~ould be more prejudicial than probative to publish the statements verbatim to the jury 
5 Two recorded interviews were conducted, the first on November 19, 2013, at the South 
Valley CJC (State's Exhibit 1), and the second on November 24, 2013, at the Vernal CJC 
(State's Exhibit 2). R.3 :70; 11 :470; see also R. I 0:32 ( district court found the videotapes 
admissible at August 27, 2013, evidentiary hearing, and found them admissible as 
~vidence at trial); R.11 :397; R.11 :420-421, and R.11 :353-54 (the court stating, "I've 
made my ruling, so I don't think any additional record is necessary on 15.5."); 
R.2:49,52,60,71 (same); R.11:447, 500. 
Further, unlike the first videotape, which was not introduced at the preliminary 
hearing, the second videotape was introduced by the State and it was admitted over 
defense objection. See R.2:49, 52, 60, 71. 
7 
t'. 
"" 
and have them delivered into the jury room, and generally to the constitutionality of Rule 
15.5 as applied. R.4:49; R.11 :353-356; R.1:453--454. 
The district court concluded that both videotaped interviews were admissible, 
VJ) finding "that the entire set of interviews ... [should] be appropriately considered by the 
trier of fact in their entirety." R.4:47. Relying on Nguyen, 2012 UT 80,111, the district 
court found both videotapes sufficiently reliable and trustworthy, and further concluded 
that the videos met the "interests of justice" requirement of Rule 15.5. R.4:45-50; 
R.3:147; R.8:386, at 5-6, 18-19. 
At trial, Cruz's counsel renewed his objection to admitting the videotapes, 
expressing serious concern with the court providing them to the jury for deliberation. See 
R.11:353-56. Add. J. The district court overruled the objections. Id. ("We know that 
these two videos have been pre-admitted and are going to be part of the evidence that the 
jury has to consider in deliberations."). A five-day jury trial commenced on September 
29, 2014, ending on October 3, 2014. R.10-14. 
Through published videotapes, M.R. told the interviewers that Cruz had "made me 
put my mouth on his weewee." R.11:439. Upon further questioning, however, M.R. 
became non-responsive and gave nonverbal cues at different times. R.11 :437--439. At 
this point, believing that M.R. had nodded affirmatively to the question whether this 
assaultive incident "happened one time or more than one time," [R.11 :439], the State 
requested the trial court to "make a record" to the jury that M.R. had indeed nodded 
affirmatively. Id. In response, the district court stated, "I'll indicate for the record that the 
child moved her head up and down." R.11 :440. When Cruz's defense counsel strenuously 
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objected, the district court, later in the trial, cautioned the jury to disregard the 
"clarification" it made earlier regarding the essence of M.R. 's nods. R.11 :455, 494--495. 
During. deliberation, but before the jury even appeared deadlocked, see R.14:866-
870, R.15 :2, See Add. K, the district court propounded Allen, instructing the jury that a 
decision was expected in a "relatively short" order. R.868. Less than 30 minutes later, the 
jury returned guilty verdicts on counts VI, VII, and VIII, deadlocked on Counts I, II, III, 
and V, and found Cruz not guilty on Count IV. R.14:870, R.15:2. The State thereafter 
moved to dismiss Counts I, II, III, and V with prejudice. R.15:2. 
Subsequently, on October 8, 2014, the district court found, and the State conceded, c;,, 
tbat Count VIII --aggravated kidnapping -- merged into the sodomy Counts VI and VII, 
and accordingly sentenced Cruz only on the convicted sodomy counts. R.15:3-4; R.16:2. 
On October 22, 2014, the district court sentenced Cruz to minimum, concurrent 
mandatory terms of twenty-five years to life, and recommended credit for time served. 
R:15:4; R.16:4. 
On October 27, 2014, Cruz timely filed his notice of appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. The Alleged Crimes 
I. The First CJC Video Interview 
M.R. 's mother, Yanet Amove, reported that she believed M.R. had been sexually 
abused by Cruz, her then live-in boyfriend. R.12:623. As a result of the report, Sergeant 
James Bigelow of the West Jordan Police Department interviewed M.R. and videotaped 
it. R.l 1:358-362, 397. Sergeant Bigelow was contacted on November 19, 2013, and 
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asked to interview M.R. The call came the day earlier from Detective Shawn Lewis of the 
Vernal, Utah, Police Department. Detective Lewis reported that Ms. Arnove had stated 
that she walked into the bedroom of the home the couple shared and saw Cruz with his 
~ pants unzipped and M.R. on the bed with him. R.11 :368-70. Detectives Bigelow and 
Jason Boss of the West Jordan Police Department had set up the interview because 
·Detective Boss spoke Spanish. R.11:374, 390. 
During this interview at the South Valley CJC, M.R. allegedly was not initially 
open to Bigelow, as the interview was in English. R.11 :382, 404. Detective Boss then 
intervened in Spanish. Rl 1:403. This time, M.R. allegedly told the detectives that Cruz 
had sexually abused her. Id. at 404-07. M.R. alleged that "my dad did something to me .. 
. . [m]y dad unzipped his pants ... I didn't want to do it. He made me do it. He made me 
put my mouth on his weewee." R.11 :430, 433. M.R. used the word "tito" to mean Cruz's 
"nuts." R.11 :443, 517. M.R. also alleged that "my dad put his hand on the door. He didn't 
let me out." R.11 :431. 
However, when asked if this incident happened more than one time, M.R. gave a 
non-verbal cue. R.11 :437-40. When asked what happened after her dad let her out of the 
room, M.R. similarly gave no verbal response. R.11 :431. 
The first CJC video interview was then played to the jury, where M.R. made the 
allegations outlined above. R.11 :421. 
2. The Second CJC Videotaped Interview 
a. Sergeant Shawn Lewis 
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Sergeant Shawn Lewis arranged the second CJC interview with M.R. based on a 
telephone call he received on November 18, 2013, from Dr. Antoinette Laskey of the 
Primary Children's Hospital. R.11 :458; R.2:44. Dr. Laskey said she examined a young 
female from Vernal, M.R., who is now in West Jordan. Sergeant Lewis therefore 
contacted the ~ est Jordan Police Department, and spoke to Detectives Bigelow and 
Boss, who advised him that a CJC interview had been conducted in West Jordan. R.11: 
462-463. Sergeant Lewis testified that he then watched the first videotape interview with 
FBI Agent Travis Lemon, who spoke Spanish. R.11 :466; R.2:46. 
Thereafter, Sergeant Lewis met with the District Attorney Mark Thomas, who 
indicated there was then insufficient information for prosecution, and therefore requested 
that another CJC interview be done to ensure that Vernal had jurisdiction to prosecute 
Cruz. R.11:468, 595; R.2:127. Accordingly, the second CJC interview was done in 
Vernal. Rll :470; R.2:46, 51. 
b. FBI Agent David Ryan 
FBI Agent Ryan next testified for the State. RI 1:476. Agent Ryan was invited to 
help investigate primarily because he spoke Spanish. R.11 :478; R.2:53. Agent Ryan had 
· asked Ms. Arnove to bring M.R. to Vernal from West Jordan on Sunday November 24, 
2013. R.11:470-71. Along with Sergeant Lewis, Agent Ryan picked Ms. Arnove and 
M.R. up from the bus station and took them to the Vernal CJC. On the way there, Agent 
Ryan told Ms. Arnove that he believed that M.R. did a good job at the first interview but 
they needed more details for prosecution. R.11 :483. 
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Agent Ryan testified that he had had NICHD-type training at the FBI and had 
done a handful of children-victim interviews a year. R.11 :484. Agent Ryan had reviewed 
the videotape since the interview on November 24, 2013. He conceded that some things 
~ in M.R.' s interview done were not consistent with his training and protocol· __ "some 
formation" issues- like, 1) can you tell me versus will you tell me; 2) being too friendly 
with MR." R.11:486. 
On cross-examination, Agent Ryan testified that when he interviews children it is 
different than when he interviews adults due to such things as children's ability to 
understand. R.11 :491. Agent Ryan indicated he has special training for interviewing 
children. Id. Such training discusses suggestibility to children, establishing that a child 
interviewee understands the difference between honesty and dishonesty. Id. Agent Ryan 
conceded that he has ''never done a perfect interview," and "there were some issues [ with 
his interview with M.R.] that weren't consistent [with the NICHD model]," and "the 
formation of some of his questions ... probably should have been different." See 
R.11:486 
..Jif) The second CJC video interview was then played to the jury, where M.R. made 
the additional allegations here. R.11 :493. 
Notably, prior to showing the second videotape to the jury, defense counsel 
objected on constitutional grounds regarding how Rule 15.5 was being applied. 
R.11 :452-455. Specifically, he pointed to the non-verbal cues and movements of M.R. in 
~ the videotape, whereby her head moved in such a way that it could be interpreted as a 
nod. He contended that this allowed the court or the prosecutor to take notice and record 
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those head movements as "nods," indicating that affirmation would be undue speculation 
as to those movements since the defense could not confront the witness and ask the real 
intent of the movements. Id.; R.11 :440-445. 
Counsel also raised a second issue regarding M.R. 's videotaped interviews. 
R.11 :456-458. Counsel raised a "confrontation clause" issue, positing that, because 
M.R. 's statements were recorded about a year prior to trial, Cruz was being denied 
effective cross-examination since the defense had no opportunity to cross-examine the 
alleged child victim at that time, but instead a year later. Counsel argued that, because of 
"children['s] understanding of time ... [i]ts extremely difficult to cross-examine a child 
that's five or six years old about something that happened a year ago." The district court 
also overruled this objection. R.11 :456-457. 
During the second interview, M.R. alleged that one day, sometime after 
y al en tine's Day in 2013, she wanted to go get some cookies out of the room her mother 
shared with Cruz. R.11 :523-525. M.R. alleged that, while in the room, Cruz put his "tito 
in my mouth." R.11:515-518. M.R. also alleged that Cruz "stuck his hand in the door" 
and did not let her go after she got the cookies. R.11 :518-523. 
M.R. further alleged that this [Cruz putting his "tito" into her mouth] happened 
more than one time. R.11 :527, 529. She also alleged that Cruz "put his tito in my butt ... 
and that hurted so bad." R: 11 :527-528. M.R. further alleged that the incidents happened 
in two separate houses; the first time was at the old house, the one with "spider web", 
when Cruz "put his tito in my butt, and the second time was ... he put his tito in my 
mouth." R.11 :533-535. She also claimed there was another incident at the old house, 
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when Cruz had her touch his "tito" and put it in her mouth. R.11 :541. M.R. further 
..;J 
allegedly described an incident in which she was awake in bed, and Cruz told her to stay · 
there, then "he put it in my butt, and he was -- he put his tito in my butt. ... [ and also] put 
~ it [w]here I pee.". She claimed that Cruz put his "tito" where she pees "more" than one 
time at the old house while he was in bed. R.11 :544-545. 
3. Objection by the Defense 
As stated, during trial, M.R. told the interviewers on the videotape that Cruz 
"made me put my mouth on his weewee" more than once R.11:439. Upon further 
questioning, however, M.R. gave nonverbal cues. R.11:437-439. At this point, the State 
· requested an instruction to the jury, which it obtained when the district court told the jury 
to find that M.R. had indeed nodded affirmatively. R.11:440. Cruz vigorously objected. 
R 11 : 441-44 2. Nevertheless, in open court, the prosecutor pressed forward, asserting that 
he made the request because he "believed it was important for the case that I'm 
presenting." Id. The district court agreed, finding that "[t]he jury certainly did see what 
nonverbal communications there were and they're going to make their determinations. All 
~ I'm doing is establishing for the record what happened when the request was made." Id. 
at 441. Further, the court continued to publish the videotape to the jury, notwithstanding 
defense counsel's request for a sidebar. Id. at 441-442. 
Thereafter, the district court convened a sidebar and defense counsel renewed his 
objection, which he deemed somewhat "moot" at this point. R.11:447. 6 However, after 
6 As defense counsel eloquently stated, he "wanted to make an argument to the Court, and 
I wanted to make it then because things become moot if we allow it to be done, even 
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the jury had watched the entirety of the first videotape, the State confessed error, stating, 
"I have no need to make those requests that the record reflects this or that ... [i]n fact, 
I'm fine[] if the Court wants to let the jury know that I was in error in asking for that in 
the first place." R.11 :454-55. The court agreed. R.11.494-495. 
Subsequently, after the jury had watched the first of the two videotapes, and heard 
the testimony of the child's interviewers, the judge cautioned the jury not to consider his 
statement about the child moving her head up and down for any purpose. R.11 :494--495. 
Then, after the jury had watched M.R. 's videotaped interviews, the district court, over 
Cruz's objection,7 admitted the videotapes as evidence and allowed them to go with the 
jury into the deliberation room. R.11 :352-54. 
B. Other Evidence Presented by the State 
I. Police Officers/Interviewers' Testimony 
At trial, the State called Detectives Bigelow and Boss, and FBI Agent Ryan to lay 
the foundation for the videotapes. R.11 :420. Defense counsel also questioned the 
detectives and the Agent regarding the extent of their investigation of the allegations, and 
whether they followed protocols in conducting the interviews. R.11 :408-11, 491-92, 
552. 
As stated above, the two CJC videotapes were played to the jury, where M.R. 
made each of the allegations outlined above. R.11:493, 501. 
though a record can be made for appeal, it defeats the purpose. So I wanted something to 
be done right then." R.11 :447 (emphasis added). 
7 Defense counsel attempted to make the his objection clear that under Rule 15.5 
testimonial evidence is different from demonstrative evidence. R.11 :354-56. 
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2. The Child Witness' Testimony 
M.R. was subsequently called as a witness. R.11 :558. The prosecutor had M.R. 
recall that they had made videotapes of what she told them, and then had her confirm that 
~ she told the truth on the videotapes. R.11 :559. However, at trial, while on t4e stand, M.R. 
. did not repeat the details of the incidents she alleged on the videotapes. 
Cruz's defense counsel "cross-examined" M.R. only with respect to who else used 
to babysit her when she lived in Vernal with Cruz. R.11:560-65. 
3. M.R. 's Mother, Ms. Yanet Arnove's, Testimony 
Ms. Amove next testified for the State. R.12:598. Ms. Arnove has three children, 
M.R., A.C., and A.C., Guillermo Rodamontis is M.R.'s father. R.12:599. Ms. Amove had 
dated Mr. Rodamontis before she met Cruz. However, she gave birth to M.R. after she 
met Cruz. R.12:599-600. 
Mr. Arnove described the first home she and Cruz shared where Cruz allegedly 
~ 
sexually abused M.R. R.12:609-11. The house they lived in was a brown, three-bedroom 
apartment, with a garage below, a mid level comprising the living room, kitchen and 
~ bathroom, and stairs leading to a second floor with the bedrooms. Id. Cruz's sister, M.L., 
her husband and their son, "W.C." or "William," shared a bedroom. Cruz, Ms. Amove, 
A.C. and A.C. shared a bedroom, and M.R. had the last one. Id. 
Ms. Amove also described the first house they lived in Vernal as a "basement 
home." They lived there for six months. Ms. Amove said she shared one bedroom with 
Cruz and her two daughters; its the house with "spider web." R.12:611. She also testified 
that she would have sex with Cruz while the girls were in the room sleeping, and there 
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was no physical partition in the room to prevent M.R. from watching the couple have sex. 
R.12:616. Ms .. Arnove detailed the type, nature and frequency of the couple's sex life, 
including oral, regular and anal sex. R.12: 61 7. 
Ms. Arnove further testified that on November 9, 2013, she picked up the mail and 
came back into the house. Cruz ate because he was home from work for lunch that day. 
A.C. and M.R·. later went upstairs with Cruz. Thereafter, Ms. Amove also went upstairs 
to go get a phone card to call Mexico, going upstairs "slowly." Ms. Arnove claimed that 
when she opened door, A.C. and M.R. and Cruz "got scared." R.12:623, R.11 :528. At 
this point, Ms. Arnove claimed she noticed that Cruz's pants were open, unbuttoned and 
his zipper was down, as he laid down on edge of bed, with M.R. right beside him, and 
A.C. on the floor on the carpet, playing with a soda drink. Ms. Amove allegedly yelled, 
"what are you doing with my daughter?" She then immediately took M.R. into the 
bathroom and.questioned her. She testified that M.R. eventually said "daddy put his tito 
in my mouth, but I'm afraid." R.12:625-28. 
Ms. Amove testified that the family generally used the word "tito" for penis and 
"semia" or "seed "for vagina. Id She testified that Cruz went back to work as planned 
after she confronted him about the incident. She said the couple had planned to go to Salt 
Lake that same day, Saturday, after Cruz came home from work, and they in fact went to 
Salt Lake and returned Monday afternoon to Vernal. She claimed that Cruz convinced her 
to go to Salt Lake because he said he had done nothing wrong. R.12:624. She stated that 
she confronted Cruz again after he came back home from work. At this point, Cruz talked ~ 
to M.R., denied the allegations, but M.R. stuck to her story. Cruz then told M.R. to go 
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play with William in the yard while he continued to discuss matters with Ms. Arnove. 
R.12:632. Ms. Amove testified that she got confused as Cruz explained thi11=gs; she did 
not know what to believe. R.12:633. She also said she went back to Vernal with Cruz 
after they came back from Salt Lake, but she later asked her brother, Salvador, to come 
get her a week later. R.12:635; R.2:35-36. In the meantime, before Salvador came to 
Vernal to pick her and the children up, Ms. Arnove and Cruz continued to have sexual 
activity. Id. 
Ms. Amove further related that when she and her daughters were leaving their 
home with Cruz, Cruz said it would be better if she killed him, saying "I love you and 
don't leave." R.12:639. Ms. Arnove said she even considered going back to Vernal with 
Cruz, but she never followed through with it. R.12:640. Nevertheless, after she left the 
home in Vernal, Ms. Arnove continued to have sex with Cruz in Salt Lake, with their two 
other daughters in the room, but not M.R. R.12:641. Ms. Amove said she eventually took 
M.R. to the doctor the Monday after arriving in Salt Lake, and she also talked to the 
police about the incident. She said she did not tell M.R. what to say during interviews. 
R.12:641-643. 
On cross examination, Ms. Arnove was unable to recall M.R. 's date of birth. 
When defense counsel noted that she had changed her responses regarding the child's 
date of birth about five times and therefore appeared generally confused, Ms. Arnove 
maintained that, even though she was easily confused about her daughter's date of birth, 
she was not confused about her testimony. R.12:671. Id. 
4. State Expert Testimony 
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Dr. Antoinette Laskey next testified for the State as an expert. R.12:688. Dr. 
Laskey had on November 18, 2013, conducted an assessment on M.R. at the hospital 
when Ms. Amove brought her in. She spent one and half hours evaluating M.R., with the 
help of a nurs~ named Mary, who spoke Spanish. R.12:703. 
Dr. Laskey testified that she had no concern about M.R. 's language proficiency. 
See R.12:706-08. She stated that she did not collect history on M.R. the day she 
evaluated her because it was not a forensic interview. Instead, she collected information 
from M.R. 's mother. She noted that she had been told that Ms. Arnove had abruptly 
moved to Salt Lake because of the "issue" with M.R. and her stepfather. R.12:709. 
However, she only had received enough information to be able to physically examine 
~.R. Dr. Laskey said the physical part of examining M.R. was "completely normal," 
meaning that she had no injuries, and Dr. Laskey communicated this news to MR. 
R.12:710-714. 
On Cross, Dr. Laskey indicated that she did not talk to M.R. because she did not 
want to "contaminate her interview." R.12:716. 
The State at this point rested. R.12:719. 
Defense counsel made no motion to dismiss the charges against Cruz. Id 
C. Evidence Presented By the Defense 
1. Defe.nse Expert Testimony 
Dr. Vicky Gregory testified as an expert for Cruz. R.12:720,741. Dr. Gregory is a 
psychologist and an attorney. R.12:721. She has written several books on child 
maltreatment. R.12:722. The summary of a chapter in a book she wrote dealt with the 
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difficulty of interviewing young children. Children interviews, she states, should be done 
· to "maximize the reliability and minimize the amount of suggestibility or taint other 
information that could come into the interview." R.12:723. Dr. Gregory is familiar with 
vi) CJC, describing it as an agency that interviews children in videotaped rooms by police 
officers and others. She recalled that before CJC existed, there was the Family Support 
Center, where she had also worked. R.12:724. 
In addition, Dr. Gregory had worked in over 200 cases for the District Attorneys in 
Utah, and testified numerous times for the state as an expert. R.12:725. She has done a 
child forensic interview before and gained 25 years of experience from working at the 
family center. She said she has incorporated more recent techniques used at CJC, but she 
does not follow the same protocols used at CJC. R.12:734-36. 
Dr. Gregory further testified that she had read over 100 articles on child abuse an~ 
sex abuse cases. She opined that the interviewer should be neutral and not suggestive to 
the child. "Questions should not be repeated over and over again, because when you do 
that, you may be giving the child the idea that they didn't answer it right the first, second, 
and third time." R.12:743-3 
In preparing to testify in this case, Dr. Gregory had reviewed police reports from 
both West Jordan and the Vernal Police Departments, the medical evaluation of Dr. 
Laskey, the DVD by Sergeant Bigelow and Detective Boss, the DVD by Special Agent 
Ryan, the information, preliminary hearing transcript, a typed statement from Mr. Cruz, 
and had read the in limine motion transcript. R.12:745 
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She noted that Ms. Arnove questioned M.R. for 15 minutes after the alleged 
incident. R.12:745. She expressed concern that the allegations came from an adult, 
M.R. 's mother, as opposed to the child; and thus more likely to be false because it was 
not recorded. R.12:746. She discussed research showing mothers often mischaracterized 
what their child said. R.12:748. She opined that a child at age six does not have good 
conception of time, especially weeks and months, as they express themselves in 
"jumbled, not linear statements." R.12:749-50. Dr. Gregory testified that research and 
experience shows that children are more open to suggestion than adults, and that 
inappropriate questioning can increase a child's suggestibility. Where inappropriate 
questioning occurs, an adult can "indoctrinate false beliefs in a child in a single session." 
Id. As an example, she discussed the case of a babysitter who got a child to falsely 
. believe that she had participated in bizarre sexual abuse and killing of animals. R.12:751 
On cross examination, the State had Dr. Gregory review the material she cited in 
the report she prepared for this case. R.12:752-59. An article she cited stated, "[i]n 
general, improbable allegations are more often raised by parents than by the child." 
R.12:755. She_ testified that the sources she used apply "across the field." R.12:755. 
However, Dr. Gregory conceded that the rate of false allegations in non-custodial 
disputes are very low, three to eight percent. R.12:756. Further, in one study cited by Dr. 
Gregory, only 1.5 percent of the non-custodial dispute cases involved false allegations of 
sexual abuse of the child. R.12:758. 
Nevertheless, Dr. Gregory testified she believed that it was M.R. 's mother who 
made the initial allegation in this case rather than M.R. on her own. R.12:760. This was 
21 
significant to her as she was concerned about M.R. not telling the truth at her interviews, 
or not even knowing the difference between truth and lies. R.12:762. Dr. Gregory 
confirmed the statement in her report that categorizes M.R. as being in a stage where 
~ children want to be perceived as obedient and that it could affect her ability to tell truth 
and lie. Thus, she said, it is important to explore issues of truth and lie with M.R. 
R.12:763-65. Dr. Gregory conceded, however, that when young children try to lie they 
. are most often unsuccessful. Finally, Dr. Gregory conceded that she used a case study 
article as authority to support the idea that its assertions are generally accepted 
~ propositions without citing outside authority to support it. R.12:766-67. 
2. Ms. Amove's Defense Testimony 
Defense counsel next called Ms. Amove. R.13:781. Ms. Amove testified that 
using the word "tito" came from Cruz's family and she adopted it. She confirmed that she 
had used it with M.R., as well as the word "semia," but was clear that Cruz "wouldn't use 
that word." R.13:782-3. Ms. Arnove testified that "Marylou would always tell her kid, 
'Cover your tito. Cover your tito."' Id. M.R. would hear this, asked questions about her 
little cousin William and the "tito," and so M.R. and Ms. Amove "ended up keeping the 
word." R.12:609, 13:78-34. 
Cruz elected to not testify. R.13:786. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
First, the plain language of Rule 15.5 indicates that it requires that admission of an 
...;; out-of-court statement be based on a showing of reliability and tmstworthiness. 
However, because evidence is admissible under the rule does not necessarily mean it 
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comports with the Confrontation Clause and the right to a fair trial. Here, the State failed 
to demonstrate, and the district court erred in finding, that M.R. 's testimony in the 
videotapes was reliable and trustworthy, not only to be admitted at trial, but to also be 
allowed in the.jury room for deliberation. For example, despite M.R.'s ability to testify 
under oath, introduction at trial of her out-of-court statements in the videotapes one year 
later precluded Cruz from effectively cross-examining her and thus deprived him of the 
right to meaningful confrontation, as recognized in Villarreal, for the delay, among other 
things, foreclosed potential avenue for timely attacking the veracity of her claims. 
Moreover, Utah appellate courts had long held that "testimonial" evidence may not be 
taken to the jury room for deliberation. The district court violated Cruz' right to 
confrontation and to a fair trial when it allowed the uncross-examined videotapes in the 
deliberation room when the jury did not request for it. Just as portions of transcripts of 
testimony were not permitted in the jury room so as not to over-emphasize the testimony 
of the witness, recorded CJC interviews of children, which are also "testimonial," and not 
subject to cross-examination, should not be permitted in jury deliberation. 
Second, Cruz recognizes that a trial court can give curative instructions when it 
has previously erred. However, some errors are of such magnitude that they have to be 
presumed so harmful and prejudicial that they cannot be cured by an instruction. Such is 
the case here where the district court not only erred in instructing the jury to view M.R. 
nodding her head as an affirmative response to whether she was sexually abused by Cruz 
more than once, but also failed to timely give the curative instruction when requested by 
defense counsel. The delay in cautioning the jury, coupled with the weakness in the 
23 
State's case, and lack of any physical evidence of sexual abuse, further magnified the 
prejudicial nature of the district court's ineffective curative instruction. 
Third, an Allen charge sometimes has the tendency to pressure jurors to give up 
their sincere convictions and convict a defendant simply because a majority takes a 
different view. Here, the Allen charge by the district court was unnecessary and 
·premature because the jury had not indicated that it was deadlocked when given. Further, 
the Allen charge became coercive when the court asked the jury to come back with a 
decision "in a relatively short order." The fact that thirty minutes later the jury came back 
swiftly with a decision shows coercion. Moreover, the fact that the jury acquitted Cruz on 
one of the counts further indicates the coercive effect of the Allen charge in this case. 
Accordingly, this Court should review this issue notwithstanding defense counsel's 
failure to preserve. 
Fourth, although defense counsel also failed to move to dismiss at the close of the 
State's case-in-chief, it should have been obvious to the district court that counsel was 
ineffective for not __ challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. This Court can review trial 
counsel's inaction for plain error. When so reviewed, this Court can conduct its own 
sufficiency analysis, and should find that the evidence presented by the State was weak 
and insufficient to support the guilty verdicts. This Court can reach that conclusion 
because of the additional errors committed by the district court, including the erroneous 
instruction to the jury to assume that M.R. was credible in nodding her head in response 
to whether the alleged incidents happened more than one time, and the premature and 
coercive Allen charge to the jury to hurriedly come back with a verdict. 
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Fifth, the cumulative effect of the errors here, some of which are of constitutional 
magnitude, shows that Cruz did not receive a fair trial as contemplated by the Sixth 
Amendment. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE CJC 
VIDEOTAPED TESTIMONIES OF M.R. IN VIOLATION OF THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE IN THE SIXTH AMENDMENT WHERE THE 
UNRELIABLE, UNCROSS-EXAMINED VIDEOTAPES WERE ALSO 
PROVIDED TO THE JURY FOR DELIBERATION. 
A. The Historic Role of the Confrontation Clause 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal 
prosecution to confront the witnesses against him. This right to confrontation also 
embodies the right to cross examination. See e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 
S.Ct. 1105 (1974) ("Confrontation means more than being allowed to confront the 
witness physically ... a primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-examination"); 
State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah 1977) (same, discussing Article I, Section 
12 of the Utah Constitution); Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 424. 
The Supreme Court in Crawford noted that "the principal evil at which the 
Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and 
particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused." 541 U.S. at 
50. In other words, the Crawford Court held that where testimonial evidence is at issue, 
the only "indicium of reliability" able to satisfy the Sixth Amendment is confrontation. 
See id. at 68-69; accord, Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 424 ("Although the confrontation clauses 
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of the state and federal constitutions protect similar values, those clauses are not 
coterminous with the hearsay rule and its exceptions."). 
Thus, as the State acknowledged, prior to offering the videotapes, Rule 15 .5 
;.rs) · required the district court to determine whether M.R. 's recorded hearsay statements are 
sufficiently reliable and trustworthy, and that the interest of justice will best be served by 
their admission at trial. See UTAH R. CRIM. P.15.5; State In Limine Motion, R.3:70; see · 
also R.3: 141-14 2 ( district court stating that reliability, trustworthiness, and interests of 
justice must first be shown). 
B. Admission of Out of Court Testimonial Evidence Must Meet Crawford 
Standard 
Cruz makes no wholesale constitutional attack on the admission of M.R. 's 
videotaped interviews. See State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 876 (Utah 1993) (defendant's 
right to confrontation not violated by admission of videotaped interview of alleged child 
victim of sexual abuse, even though victim testified at trial that she did not remember 
whether she had been abused by defendant; defendant could not rely on victim's lack of 
memory as basis for arguing that she was constitutionally unavailable); Nguyen, 2012 UT 
80, if27 (same). What Cruz primarily objects to is the district court's determination that 
M.R.' s uncross-examined hearsay testimony in the videotapes was so reliable and 
trustworthy that it should also be provided to the jury in deliberation.8 R.11 :353; R.3:83-
8 See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 17(1), providing that "[u]pon retiring for deliberation, the jury 
may take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits which have been 
received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the 
possession of the jury .... The court shall permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. . 
. . "). (emphasis added). 
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85,141-142, R.8:386 at 5-6,12, 18. But Cf Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 424 (noting that "the 
right of a defendant to confront an accuser may bar evidence that might otherwise be 
admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule.") (citations omitted). 
In determining whether recorded statements of this nature are sufficiently reliable 
and trustworthy, courts look to such factors as "the age and maturity of the child, the 
nature and duration of the abuse, the relationship of the child to the offender, and the 
reliability of the assertion and of the child." State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41,120; 48 P.3d 
931. For the reasons discussed below, the district court's findings on the reliability and 
trustworthiness of the videotapes are truncated and should be reversed for clear error. 
1. Age and Maturity of Child 
With regard to the age and the maturity of the child witness, M.R., her age and 
maturity levels cut against the district court's finding of reliability and trustworthiness. 
R.8:386 at 12. Notably, in both M.R. 's interviews, the interviewers were unable to follow 
standard procedure and protocol in order to establish sufficient competency of the child 
to understand the subject matter, to recall information and probe memory, and 
importantly, the interviewer did not have sufficient opportunity to have the child 
demonstrate an understanding of what it meant to tell the tmth. In fact, FBI Agent Ryan 
conceded that ·he did not strictly follow the protocols when interviewing M.R. See 
R.11 :486. In addition, M.R. was easily distracted and playful. In sum, the full extent of 
M.R. 's cognitive, intellectual, developmental and social development was not reviewed 
i;n more detail by the district court before finding that M.R. was able to distinguish truth 
from fantasy, or understood a truth from a lie. Nor did the court explore her level of 
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suggestibility in relaying information. 9 
2. Nature and Duration of Abuse 
In the videotaped interviews M.R at times indicates that Cruz sexually abused her 
more than once, and at other times gives non-verbal responses on this point, which Cruz 
was unable to cross-examine. R.11 :439. Similarly, as mentioned above, M.R. did not 
. describe any physical acts that she could not have potentially witnessed her mother and 
Cruz perform with her own eyes. See,e.g., R.12:615-17 (Ms. Arnove testifying that she 
and Cruz engaged in different types of sexual activities with M.R. present in the room, 
but "asleep."). M.R. was never asked whether she had ever witnessed any such behavior 
· among other people, and counsel was unable to cross-examine on this point. Finally, as to 
duration of abuse, M.R. 's testimony was extremely unreliable and confusing due to her 
seeming limited conception of time. 10 
3. Reliability of Assertion and of M.R. 
The reliability of M.R. 's assertions is also suspect. The district court found M.R. 's 
testimony in the videotapes "sufficiently reliable and trustworthy." R.8:386 at 19. But 
9 The district court made additional findings regarding whether M.R. 's testimony on the 
videotapes were linear and logical; that some of the events happened within a short of 
period of time to when she gave the interview; that M.R. did not make grandiose or 
bizarre statements, nor did it appear that she had been coached. The district court 
therefore concluded, "So, on that basis I believe her testimony is sufficiently reliable and 
trustworthy." R.8:386, at 18-19. See Add. L. It is Cruz's position that the district court's 
findings here did not measure up to what is required by Rule 15 .5 and the cases 
interpreting it. See,e.g., Nguyen, 2011 UT App 2, 110, affirmed by Nguyen, 2012 UT 80,1 
27. 
10 The jury would apparently agree with this as they were deadlocked on four of the 
charges and acquitted on a fifth. 
28 
the interviewers were unable to discern M.R. 's understanding of what it meant to tell the 
truth or demonstrate the understanding of the importance of telling the truth. Further, the 
interviewer was unable to obtain any significant details about time, place, or number of 
<?ccurrences. For example, M.R. generally described one basement room the family 
shared with the "spider webs," and their current residence. R.11 :534; see also supra note 
14 and text accompanying it. 
Moreover, the district court's assertion that there is no evidence of coaching is also 
inaccurate. R.8:386 at 18-19. In viewing both videotapes, it is apparent that M.R. had 
talked to adults before being interviewed. In fact, Ms. Arnove testified that she 
questioned M.R. for some time in the bathroom the day of the incident. R.12: 628. 11 
In sum, the record shows that M.R. knew why she was being interviewed by the officers, 
and it is clear that she had either been questioned by, or discussed the allegations, with 
adults in the recent past. Further, it appears that M.R. echos words that she has heard 
adults say, such as "tito." Perhaps worse yet is the revelation that Cruz and Ms. Amove 
repeatedly had sexual activities in the same room with M.R., and that her view was 
completely unobstructed. R.12:616-17. Thus, the claim that M.R. disclosed the alleged 
abuse in her own words and without suggestion or prompting is not necessarily accurate. 
Rather, M.R. appeared to mimic words she heard, and could have been describing 
conduct she may have seen. This is so in light of Ms. Amove testimony that she and Cruz 
had various types of sexual activities within line of sight of their daughters. 
11 Notably, at trial, Dr. Gregory testified that one should be suspicious of reported 
incidents in which the mother made the report, as opposed to the child, and where the 
mother had also previously questioned the child. R.12:745-46. 
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In short, in looking at the foregoing factors, the videotaped accounts of M.R. do 
not appear reliable or trustworthy by any means. Nevertheless, as shown below, there are 
significant, additional constitutional problems with the district court's finding that M.R. 's 
@ _ videotapes were sufficiently reliable to be allowed in the jury deliberation room. 
C. The District Court's Decision to Provide M.R.'s Videotaped Interviews, 
Which Were Not Subjected to Cross-Examination Until More than One Year 
Later, to the Jury For Deliberation Essentially Denied Cruz Both the Rights 
~ of Confrontation and Fair Trial. 
Pursuant to Crawford, an out-of-court statement of a child witness could only be 
properly admitted when all the requirements of Rule 15.5 were met. See Seale, 853 P.2d 
at 870-71; Nguyen, 2011 UT App 2, ,IlO, at n.9, 246 P.3d 535. In addition, just because 
evidence is admissible under the rules does not necessarily mean it comport_s with the 
confrontation and/or fair trial clauses. Cf Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 424 (stating that 
confrontation clause and evidentiary rules are not coterminous, and that the clause may 
bar admissible evidence). In other words, testimonial evidence is still subject to the 
scrutiny of the confrontation clause. Id.; see also Salt Lake City v. George, 2008 UT App .. 
257, ,I 8-10; 189 P.3d 1284, 1287. This is because the focus of the confrontation clause is 
on the witnesses bearing testimony against the accused. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
'"Testimony,' in tum, is typically '[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the 
purpose of establishing or proving some fact."' Id at 51 (alteration in original) (quoting 1 
N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)). 
Consequently, while this Court has upheld admission of hearsay statements of 
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child witnesses under Rule 15.5, if the trial court made appropriate findings, 12 allowing 
M.R. 's videotaped statements to go into the jury deliberation room with a DVD player 
appears to be an issue of first impression. But the procedure employed by the district 
court here certainly was not compelled by the rules, see supra note 12, is anathema to 
Villarreal, and only served to over-emphasize that evidence -- which is in the testimony 
of the complaining child-witness, M.R. -- to the exclusion of all other evidence. 
Notably, Utah appellate courts had long held that testimonial evidence may not be 
taken to the jury room. E.g., State v. Solomon, 96 Utah 500, 87 P.2d 807 (1939). 
Similarly, in State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629 (Utah 1994) (superseded by Statute), the Utah 
Supreme Court referenced a then more recent decision, State v. Davis, 689 P .2d 5 (Utah 
1984) (superseded on other grounds). 13 Citing Solomon with approval, Davis held that 
the district court erred in giving the jury the opportunity to take parts of a deposition into 
the jury room for deliberation. Id. at 14-15. However, the court did not reach the question 
of prejudicial nature or harmlessness of the error because the defense failed to object. Id. 
at 15. 
Although Carter dealt with the Utah death penalty statute, it is instructive in this 
case because it discusses rule l 7(k) of the rules of criminal procedure, stating: 
Rule 17(k) states, "Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them 
the instructions of the court and all exhibits and papers which have been 
12 See,e.g., Nguyen, 2011 UT App 2, ,r10, affirmed by Nguyen, 2012 UT 80,,J 27. 
13 Both Carter and Davis were superseded by statute. The Utah Supreme Court banned 
victim impact testimony in Carter; the Utah death penalty statute was subsequently 
amended to permit victim impact testimony with limitations. 
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received as evidence, except depositions .... " Utah R. Crim. P. 17(k) 
( emphasis added). While not directly on point, rule l 7(k) indicates that exhibits 
which are testimonial in nature should not be given to the jury . during its 
deliberations. 
We further hold that ''the transcript of all [prior] testimony" contemplated by 
section 76-3-207(4) is admissible in oral form only and must not be introduced 
into evidence as an exhibit or given to the jury to use during deliberation. 
Id. 888 P .2d at 643 ( emphasis original). 
Again, Cruz recognizes that Carter was a death penalty case, and has been 
superseded by statute, where the law now allows for victim impact testimony. Cruz 
further recognizes that the language of Rule 18(k), which is today Rule 17(1), has 
changed significantly. Specifically, the words "except depositions" has been replaced by. 
· "except exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the 
jury, such as exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband .... The court shall permit 
the jury to view exhibits upon request. ... " See supra n.12. 
Nevertheless, as Villarreal held, "the right of a defendant to confront an accuser 
may bar evidence that might otherwise be admissible under an exception to the hearsay 
rule." Id., 889 P.2d at 424. Thus, unlike Davis, where defense counsel made no objection 
on constitutional grounds or otherwise, Cruz's defense counsel complained several times_ 
on constitutional grounds to the district court about granting the jury access for 
deliberation to M.R. 's uncross-examined videotaped testimony. R.11 :352-54; see also 
supra note 10. As Villarreal noted in a different context, "it is fundamental that to ensure 
accuracy and reliability, testimony should be given under oath in open court with the 
opportunity for cross-examination." 889 P .2d at 424 ( emphasis added). As such, just as 
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portions of transcripts of testimony were not permitted to go to the jury room so as not to 
over-emphasize the testimony of the witness, recorded CJC children testimonials should 
also not be permitted in the jury room. More disturbing is the fact that M.R. 's videotaped 
testimony taken to the jury room was not subjected at all to cross-examination and thus 
implicating the confrontation clause. See Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 424 (finding that 
"although Bedient was sworn, it was impossible for Villarreal to cross-examine him as to 
the truthfulness of the statements. The factual propositions asserted in the prosecution's 
leading questions may very well have been considered truthful statements, given 
Bedient's unresponsiveness.") (emphasis added). 
The same is true here: although M.R. "testified" at trial, it was impossible for 
Cruz's defense counsel to effectively cross-examine her regarding, inter alia, her non-
responsive head movements --made in a videotaped interview a year earlier--, whether 
they were indicative of affirmation, particularly where the district court also vouched for 
her credibility with the needless jury instruction given on behalf of the State. In sum, 
"[t]he factual proposition asserted in the [district court's vouching for M.R.'s credibility 
by the judicial notice taken of her head movement] may very well have been considered 
truthful statements" by the jury. Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 424. 
There i~ no question that allowing M.R. 's uncross-examined videotapes in the jury 
room was prejudicial, particularly in light of the additional argument below, that the 
district court also impermissibly vouched for M.R. 's credibility in the videotapes, by 
taking her head movement as an affirmative response to whether she had been abused 
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more than once. R.11 :440-47. Clearly, Cruz's defense counsel could not cross-examine 
M.R., effectively or otherwise, on what her head movement meant. See R.11 :440--42 
(defense counsel threatening to make his objection directly in the Jury's presence). 14 Cf 
Villarreal, 859 P .2d at 425 ( discussing how admission of similar hearsay denied the 
defendant "effective opportunity to cross-examine [the declarant] on facts that were 
central to establishing [the defendant J's guilt."). As such, permitting the jury to take the 
videotapes of M.R. 's interviews into the jury room not only over-emphasized the 
evidence over others, it also denied Cruz the right to effective cross-examination on a 
matter central to guilt or innocence. It is therefore immaterial whether the procedure 
utilized by the district "comports" with the revamped Rule 17(1). This is because 
admission of a particular evidence may comport with evidentiary rules but yet violative 
of the confrontation clause. See Villarreal, 889 P .2d at 424. 
"Where 'the error in question amounts to a violation of a defendant's right of 
confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment ... , its harmlessness is to be judged 
by a higher standard, i.e., reversal is required unless the error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt."' Villarreal, 889 P .2d at 425 ( citations omitted). In tum, whether an 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt involves looking at the importance of the 
witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the 
presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the 
witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the 
14 Later in the trial, the court allowed defense counsel to make his objections for the 
record, R. 44 7, which was not apparent on the record because it was not traJ.?-SCribed when 
counsel first objected to the evidence, at R.1 :440-42. 
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overall strength of the prosecution's case. Id. at 425-26 (citations omitted). 
Here, notably, the State's case against Cruz depended mostly on M.R. 's uncross-
examined videotaped interviews. In fact, the State argued as much in its in limine motion, 
stating that the second videotape was admissible in the interest of justice "[i]n light of the G 
child victim's young age and the gravity of the conduct alleged against the Defendant ... 
. '' R.3 :70-7 5; ~.3: 83-85; see also R.11 :440 (prosecutor asserting that it needed the 
district court to take judicial notice of M.R. nodding her head as indicative of being 
truthful); R.11 :468, 595; R.2: 127 (the State further acknowledged the weakness in its 
case when the prosecutor asked M.R. 's interviewers to conduct additional interviews to 
be able to demonstrate that Uintah County even had jurisdiction). 
Additionally, the State's case clearly was not a "slam dunk," as the State expert 
witness confirmed that her physical evaluation of M.R. yielded no evidence of sexual 
~buse. R.12:711-12 ("The physical part of the examination ofM.R. was "'completely 
normal"'). That is, there was virtually no physical evidence linking Cruz to the alleged 
crimes. R.12:710. Further illustrating weakness in the State's case was the jury acquitted 
Cruz of one count and deadlocked on four others. R.14:870, R.15:2. Accordingly, in this 
case, where the uncross-examined videotapes provided the central link to Cruz's guilt, 
erroneously allowing them into the jury room for deliberation can not be deemed 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 425-26. 
POINT II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY INTERVENING AT TRIAL AT 
THE BEHEST OF THE STATE IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY TO ASSUME 
THAT NON-VERBAL CUES MADE BY THE CHILD-WITNESS CONSTITUTE 
AN AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE. 
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A. Statement of the Law 
Cruz recognizes that "curative instructions are a settled and necessary feature of 
. our judicial process and one of the most important tools by which a court may remedy 
errors at trial." State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262,271 (Utah 1998). "If a trial judge could 
not correct errors as they occur, few trials would be successfully concluded. Moreover, 
~ our judicial system greatly relies upon the jury's integrity to uphold the jury oath, 
· including its promise to follow all of the judge's instructions." Id. at 272 (emphasis in 
original). Accord, Toki, 2011 UT App. 293,if 33. Additionally, '"[t]he sufficiency of ... a 
curative instruction must be determined under all the circumstances .... "'Harmon, 956 
P.2d at 279, n.9 (citation and quoted case omitted). 
B. Application of Law to Facts 
Cruz concedes that that the district court attempted to alleviate the impact of its 
erroneous instruction that the jury view M.R. 's head movement as an affirmative 
response to whether she was abused more than once. See R.11 :455, 494--495. See Add. 
M. But this and other courts have also recognized that curative instructions are not 
always a panacea, such that they can be presumed "harmful and prejudicial," particularly 
when considered in light of the gravity of the charges against the defendant and the 
,..i) evidence adduced by the State. See, e.g., State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388,390,407 
(Utah 1989) (admission of expert testimony regarding victim's credibility exacts 
"pervasive impact" on trial, where testimony was about two-thirds of trial transcript and 
occupied several trial days); accord Harmon, 956 P.2d at 273; Toki, 2011 UT App 293, 
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,I34. In short, courts have recognized that belated cautionary instructions following an 
error of this type differ significantly from errors involving "elements instructions" where 
courts can presume that juries necessarily followed instructions. See Toki, 2011 UT App 
293, ifl9; see also United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1291 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[A] 
prompt and effective .. curative instruction from the trial judge may effectively 
'neutralize the damage."' ( emphasis added). 
Given the nature of the numerous, serious charges facing Cruz, and the fact that 
the State's case was weak15 but for M.R. 's videotaped testimony, the district court's 
needless intervention more likely than not influence the jury to believe that M.R. testified 
credibly, and thus more likely to convict Cruz for sodomy. See Villarreal, 889 P .2d 424 
(similarly assuming that erroneously admitted evidence "may very well have been 
considered truthful statements [by the jury]"). Accordingly, this Court should reverse 
Cruz's conviction and remand for retrial. 
Cruz anticipates that the State will attempt to demonstrate that the curative 
instruction given here negated any prejudice caused by the district court's intervention. 
See,e.g., Toki, 2011 UT App 293, ,I34. But curative instructions are sometimes unable to 
cure prejudicial intervention of this type. See Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 407; Harmon, 956 
P.2d at 273. Further, comparable to the magnitude of the error in Rimmasch, 
compounding the problem here is the district court's failure to immediately recognize the 
damage done by its instruction and to correct it immediately, as requested. R.11 :441-42. 
Rather than give a timely curative instruction, and notwithstanding counsel's strenuous 
15 See infra note 19 and text accompanying it. 
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objection, the district court acted as if nothing was wrong, proceeded with the trial 
unperturbed, only to then issue the curative instruction later in the trial when the State felt 
compelled to confess error. R.11 :441-94. 
However, as defense counsel pointed out, to be effective, errors of th_is type must 
. be corrected "right then." R.11:447 ( emphasis added). See also Harmon, 956 P .2d at 273 
(citing federal and state cases, and noting that "(s]ome errors may be too prejudicial for 
curative instructions to mitigate their effect."); State v. Auble, 754 P.2d 935, 937 (Utah 
1988) (stating that limiting instructions may not be effective to prevent jury· from 
;..;J · considering unfairly prejudicial evidence). 
Here, the district court's curative instruction was neither prompt nor effective. 
Additionally, the State's case against Cruz comprised mainly of M.R. 's hearsay in the 
videotapes. There was no physical evidence linking Cruz to the crime. R.12:710. And, as 
it promised, the State relied wholeheartedly at trial on M.R. 's videotaped testimony. 
See,e.g., R.3:70-75,83-85 (in limine motion where the State claims it badly needed the 
evidence); Rl 1: 441-42 (prosecutor asserting that he made the request for the judicial 
notice of M.R. 's head movements because he "believed it was important for the case that 
I'm presenting."). Accordingly, given the weakness in the State's case, and the district 
court's untimely attempt to cure the error regarding the essence of M.R. nodding her 
head, this Court should find that the district court's erroneous intervention on behalf of 
the State was "so prejudicial and devastating ... as to vitiate the mitigating effect of the 
~ court's curative instruction." Harmon, 956 P.2d at 273. 
POINT III. THE DISTRICT COURT DENIED CRUZ A FAIR TRIAL UNDER 
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THE SIXTH AMENDMENT BY GIVING A PREMATURE AND COERCIVE 
ALLEN CHARGE. 
A. Statement of the Law 
1. The Allen Charge 
In evaluating issuance of an Allen charge, the reviewing court must "consider [ 1] 
whether the la~guage of the supplemental charge can properly be said to be coercive [per 
se ], and [2] whether it is coercive under the specific circumstances of the case" State v. 
Harry, 2008 UT App 224, ,r 7, 198 P.2d 198 (other citations omitted). An Allen charge 
may not, however, deny a defendant a fair and impartial trial. State v. Ginter, 2013 UT 
App 92, ,r 6, 3·00 P.3d 1278. "[T]he non-coercive use of Allen charges is permitted in 
Utah because such charges [are] a reasonable and proper exercise of the court's power to 
guide the jury to a fair and impartial verdict." Ginter, 2013 UT App 92, ,r 6, 300 P.3d 
1278 (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
However, an Allen instruction presupposes "the jury [] inform[ing] the judge 
that they were unable to reach a verdict." Id. at 6, 300 P.3d at 1278. "Ultimately, the 
correctness of the charge must be determined by the consideration of the facts of 
each case and ·the exact words used by the trial court." Ginter, 2013 UT App 92, if 6, 
300 P.3d 1278 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). 
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel or Plain Error for Failure to Object to the 
Allen charge. 16 
16 Cruz's appellate counsel contemplated, but decided against, filing a Rule 23B remand 
motion because the record on the issue is patent. See R.14:866-70. 
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Under the Supreme Court's two-part test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), Cruz must show that trial counsel's performance was 
objectively deficient, and that such deficient performance was prejudicial to him. Id. at 
687. Failure to establish either prong of the test is fatal to Cruz's ineffectiveness claim. 
See State v. Honie, 2014 UT 19,,r 31,342 P.3d 182. This court "Generally, an 
a~torney's performance will be held ineffective only when there is no tactical or 
strategic justification for his conduct of the trial." State v. Colonna, 7 66 P .2d 1062, 
1066 (Utah 1988) ( citations omitted). 
B. Application of Law to Facts 
The exact words used by the district court were that he wanted a decision by the 
jury "in a relatively short period." R.14:868. See Add. N. There is nothing strategic about 
defense counsel's failure to object to the district court's additional comment to the jury in 
the Allen charge about wanting a verdict in a short order. First, the circumstances 
surrounding the Allen charge was unusual because the record does not reflect that the jury 
believed itself deadlocked. R.14:862-66. Thus, when issued, the charge was 
"peremptory," and because of the odd posture, it was given with the question as to 
whether the jury had reached a unanimous verdict on any of the Counts. See id. Second, . 
and more problematic, is the additional comment by the district court, not in terms of the 
actual instruction, but in delivering it, where the court essentially told the jury it expected 
a response "in a relatively short order." R.14:868-69. That response then came swiftly 
from the jury, within 30 minutes of the Allen charge and the district court's additional, 
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coercive comments. 
Naturally, this Court must be sensitive to an Allen charge "because of its perceived 
tendency to pressure jurors to give up their sincere convictions simply because a majority 
takes a different view." State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Utah 1987) (other 
citations omitted). Whether an Allen charge passes muster as "a reasonable and proper 
exercise of the court's power to guide the jury to a fair and impartial verdict" 17 must be 
"determined by the consideration of the facts of each case and the exact words used by 
the trial court." Ginter, 2013 UT App 92, ~ 5, 300 P.3d at 1280. 
Here, although the district court specifically mentioned the ABA standard for 
issuing an Allen charge, that standard relates to deadlocked juries. However, the record 
does not reflect that the jury indicated being deadlocked. R.14:866-70. Rather, the 
district court merely observed that deliberation had gone on quite long and for an 
extended period of, presumed to draw the jury out of deliberation to ask whether they had 
unanimous verdicts on any counts, and whether further deliberations would be reasonably 
likely to result in unanimous verdicts. See R.14:861,863-66 (prosecutor and judge 
discussing "exploring" with the jury the possibility of being hung). In conjunction with 
the district co1:1rt's statement that he expected the jury to response in short order, the 
instruction became coercive when it suggested to the jury that if they came up with 
verdicts on any Counts they could be released from their duties. 
In sum, the nature of the instruction, given before the jury indicated it was actually 
17 State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 30 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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deadlocked, and the substance and delivery of it -- asking whether verdicts had been 
· reached on any counts, and whether further deliberations would result in unanimous 
verdicts on other counts -- was undoubtedly coercive. The fact that the jury then came in 
~ with verdicts on some counts within about thirty minutes further infonns that the 
additional comment in the Allen instruction led to compromise by the jury to end 
deliberations. Additionally, the fact that the jury acquitted Cruz on one count and 
deadlocked on others within that short period of time is further indicative of the coercive 
effect of the premature Allen charge. R.14:870. It very well may be that the jury was 
· leaning towards acquitting Cruz on all the counts before the district court gave the 
premature Allen charge with the additional coercive message that they come back with a 
vJ verdict, pronto. 
·i..;;J 
··VJ) 
POINT IV. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE WAS 
· INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT CRUZ OF SODOMY ON A CHILD. 
A. Statement of the Law 
"As a general rule, to ensure that the trial court addresses the sufficiency of the 
evidence, a defendant must request that the court do so." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 
~11, if l 4, 10 P .3d 346. 18 In this case, former counsel failed to preserve the issue, either 
18 
"A defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the conclusion of the 
State's case in chief requires the trial court to determine whether the defendant must 
proceed with the introduction of evidence in his defense." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, 
,r 40, 70 P.3d 111 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "If the State fails to 
produce believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged, the trial court must 
dismiss the charges." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)." State v. Ellis, 
2014 UT App. 185, ,rs, 336 P.3d 26. 
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through oversight or inadvertence. 19 Again, defense counsel clearly was constitutionally 
ineffective for not making the motion to dismiss because there is nothing strategic about 
failing to move for dismissal at the close of the State's case, given the posture of the case, 
where defense counsel had complained bitterly about the admission of M.R. 's videotaped Q 
testimony to convict, and the general unfairness of the trial due to insufficient 
confrontation rights safeguards. See State v. Thompson, 2014 UT 14, 326 P.3d 656 
(finding ineffective assistance of counsel based on cumulative error of trial counsel); cf 
State v. Callahan, 866 P.2d 590, 595 (Ct App. 1993) (noting that "[t]he fact that counsel 
did not file a motion in limine, or object to the questioning at trial, likely fails to meet the 
standard of reasonable representation, as the State all but concedes, thus satisfying the 
first prong of Strickland."). 
Even if this Court finds that counsel was not constitutionally ineffective, this 
Court should apply the plain error analysis. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 
1993); State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ,Il5; Utah R. Evid. 103(a); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 
30; see UTAH R. CRIM. P. l 7(p ). Further, this Court has long recognized that an 
unpreserved issue may be considered on appeal if the defendant shows exceptional 
19 Admittedly, up to this point, defense counsel had objected to admission of various 
evidence and preserved a number of issues for appeal, to the point of even drawing the ire 
of the district court on occasions. See R.11 :440-42, 44 7 ( counsel threatening to take his · 
objection to the jury and bypass the judge); see also R.11 :352-54, 370,383,407, R.8:386, 
at 5, 18-19 (other instances of counsel preserving issues). Thus, it very well may be that 
Cruz's counsel believed it would be futile to move for dismissal. Cf Tillman v. Cook, 855 
P.2d 211,222 (Utah 1993) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on failure to 
move to dismiss where evidence to convict was sufficient), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1050, 
126 L. Ed. 2d 671, 114 S. Ct. 706 (1994)). 
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'l(i;..· 
·circumstances.See State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 923 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
( collecting cases). While the burden of establishing insufficiency of evidence "is high," 
"it is not impossible" to meet. State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ,flO, 2 P.3d 954 
\ID (citations omitted); see Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,f,I41-45. 
B. Application of Law to Facts 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, the evidence the jury heard 
in convicting Cruz of sodomy includes: 
1. M.R. 's mother, Y anet Arnove, reported that she believed that M.R. had been sexually 
molested by Cruz because she walked into the bedroom of the home the couple shared 
and saw Cruz with his pants unzipped and M.R. on the bed with him. R.11:368-370; 
R.12:263. 
2. Ms. Arnove "went upstairs very softly," to the room where Cruz and M.R. were. 
R.12:623-28. When she opened the bedroom door, Cruz and M.R. got ''scared," or 
"surprised when [she] came into the room for no reason." Id. Ms. Arnove testified that 
Cruz's pants were open, unbuttoned, and the zipper was down. 
3. Ms. Amove took M.R. into the bathroom and asked her about what had happened. 
R.12:628. Ms. Arnove said that M.R. stated: "Well, mommy, what happened is that 
my daddy put his tito in my mouth, but I'm afraid." 
4. Ms. Amove testified that, to her knowledge, M.R. had never been exposed to 
pornography. R.12:618-19. When asked, she indicated that she had never talked to 
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M.R. about "titos and mouths at the same time," where babies come from, or things of 
a sexual nature, and never expressed interest in those things. Id at 630. 
5. During a video recorded interview M.R. said that "my dad did something bad to me." 
R.11 :430. "When I got upstairs I was going to eat cookies -- he didn't let me out, and 
-- .... Then he put -- my dad put his hand on the door. He didn't let me out." Id. at 
431. "My dad unzipped his pants." Id. at 433. "My dad said he went to the bathroom. 
-- but he was lying to my mom." Id. at 435. "I told my mom that he didn't let me get 
out." Id at 436. "My dad, I didn't want to do it. He made me do it. He made me put 
my mouth on his weewee." Id. at 439. 
6. M.R. also employed the word "tito" to mean Cruz' "nuts." R.11:443, 517. 
7. When asked if this happened more than one time, M.R. gave a non-verbal cue, which 
the jury may have interpreted as an affirmative, truthful response. R.11 :437-440. 
When asked what happened after her dad let her out of the room, there was similarly 
no verbal response. R.11 :431. The jury may also have interpreted to mean that she 
answered affirmatively and truthfully. See Villarreal, 889 P.2at 42 (making the same 
assumptions). 
8. During a second recorded interview M.R. testified that she wanted to go get some 
cookies out of the room her mother shared with Cruz. R.11:523-25. While in the 
room, M.R. said Cruz put his "tito in my mouth," "stuck his hand in the door," and 
did not let her go after she got the cookies. 
9. M.R. said: "He put his tito in my mouth and I didn't want to, and he shut the door. 
Then my mom walked in the door, and she saw, and then she was going to take a 
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shower, my mom, and then (inaudible), and then told me what happened, and I told 
her. When I was done telling her, she said to stay in the bathroom and don't talk to my· 
dad, and that she told me to not answer question what he said -- what he says, and I 
followed my mom everywhere." R.11:523. 
10. M.R. said that this [Cruz putting his "tito" into her mouth] happened more than one 
time. R.11 :527-529. She stated that Cruz "put his tito in my butt" and that "it hurted 
so bad." Id. M.R. said that the incidents happened in two separate houses. 
11. The first time it happened was at the old house, the one with "spider webs," when 
Cruz "put his tito in my butt, and the second time was he put his tito in my mouth. 
[sic]" R.11:533-38. At this "old house," M.R. also said "[w]hen he put it in -- he put 
it all the way where it hurt, where we poop, and it hurted really bad, and he said not to 
yell because (inaudible)." Id. 
12. M.R. also said Cruz made her touch his "tito" with her "hand" "under" the clothes 
while his pants and zipper were "up.". R.11:539-45. M.R. further described an 
incident in which she was awake in her bed, and Cruz told her to stay there, then "he 
put it in my butt, and he was -- he put his tito in my butt. ... [and also] put it [w]here I 
pee." She claimed that Cruz put his "tito" where she pees "more" than one time at the 
old house while she was in bed. 
However, detracting from the foregoing, and "establish[ing] a basis for 
overcoming the healthy dose of deference" to the jury verdict, Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 
1141--452, are the following essential facts: 
1. After reviewing the interview he conducted with M.R. on November 24, 2013, and in 
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light of his training, refresher training and familiarity with the NICHD model of 
interviewing, FBI Agent Ryan conceded that "there were some issues that weren't 
consistent with the model." R.11 :486. Specifically, he stated that the formation of his 
questions to M.R. should have been better. He also conceded that he had probably 
been overly friendly with MR. See id. 
2. Ms. Arnove testified that she and Cruz were sexually active, regularly, in the 
evenings, and in the same room they shared with their three young daughters, 
including M.R. She testified they routinely had sex on the sheets, with no physical 
barrier that would obstruct M.R. from seeing the sexual activity. R.12:615-16. She 
answered that they had sex "on the sheets" as opposed to "under the blankets." 
3. Ms. Arnove testified that she and Cruz were engaged in "oral sex," "regular sex," and 
"anal sex.'~ R.12:617. 
4. Ms. Arnove testified that they would wait until the girls fell asleep, and she believed 
that M.R. was asleep at all times because M.R. "always" snores when she sleeps. 
R.12:616-17. When asked whether M.R. were awake and if she could have seen the 
couple's sexual activities, Ms. Arnove said "no, because [M.R.] was asleep." 
5. Ms. Arnove opined that M.R. did not see her and Cruz's sexual activity "because we 
were careful." R.12:618. 
6. Ms. Arnove said that she had previously heard the word "tito" because it is a 
commonly used euphemism for penis within the family. See R.12:628-29. However, 
she also testified that although Cruz "knew it also," it is not a word that she had heard ~ 
him use to refer to himself or to his own penis. See R.12:629. 
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7. Ms. Arnove testified that after the alleged incidents in question, she continued to have 
sex with Cruz with her two younger children present with them. R.12:641--42. 
8. Ms. Arnove confirmed that she had used the word "tito" with M.R., as well as the 
word "semia" R.12:782. She conceded that she does not have any male children to 
warrant using "tito" in conversation with M.R. R.12:784. She also testified that she 
does not have conversations about penis with M.R., but M.R. would "normally" ask 
questions about little William's "tito." R.12:609. 
9. Ms. Amove was unable to remember her daughter's date of birth. R.12:671. 
10. Dr. Laskey testified that M.R. 's physical evaluation revealed negative evidence of 
sexual abuse. 
11. Dr. Gregory observed that Ms. Arnove questioned M.R. for 15 minutes after the 
alleged incident, expressing concern also that the allegations came from an adult 
rather than the child; and thus more likely to be false because the nature of questions 
posed by Ms. Arnove to M.R. were not recorded. R.12:745-50. Dr. Gregory also 
discussed the concept of "indoctrination by false belief." 
12. The jury deadlocked on four counts against Cruz, and found him not guilty on one. 
R.14:870. 
13. The district court gave an untimely and ineffective curative instruction, after 
erroneously vouching for M.R. 's credibility on the videotapes. R.11 :455, 494-95. 
14. The district court prematurely gave an Allen instruction and then asked the jury to 
respond with a verdict in a relatively short order. R.14:866. 
15. The jury came back with some guilty verdict less than thirty minutes after the 
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coercive Allen instruction. R.14:870, R.15:2. 
Accordingly, as stated, the State's case against Cruz was neither overwhelming 
nor insurmountable. The jury acquitted Cruz on one count and deadlocked on four others 
further illustrated that the State's case was not a "slam dunk." R.14:870. Therefore, even 
without subtracting the videotaped testimony of M.R. that went to the jury room from the 
calculus of evidence supporting convictions, and the prejudicial "judicial notice" taken by 
the district court when it 'vouched' in a roundabout way for M.R. 's credibility, coupled 
with the premature and coercive Allen instruction, this Court should reverse Cruz's 
convictions because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, "is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that [Cruz] committed the crimes of which he ... was 
convicted." Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, if46. 
The evidence heard by the jury was insufficient to support convicting Cruz of 
sodomy. This is even more so where the State's case comprised mostly ofM.R. 's 
uncross-examined hearsay testimony which was erroneously allowed in deliberations and 
was thus over-emphasized over other evidence, and the district court also gave an 
untimely curative instruction and a coercive Allen charge, which both tainted the jury. 
Accordingly, it should have been obvious to the district court that defense counsel erred 
and was constitutionally ineffective for failing to move for dismissal of the charges, and 
the error was clearly harmful to Cruz. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. 
POINT V. CUMULATIVE ERROR WARRANTS REVERSAL OF CRUZ'S 
CONVICTIONS AND A NEW TRIAL 
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Cruz contends that the cumulative impact of the errors by the district court and 
defense counsel as related above warrants a new trial. Under the cumulative error 
doctrine, this Court should reverse "if 'the cumulative effect of the several errors 
~ undermines [its] confidence ... that a fair trial was had.'" Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1229 
( quoted case omitted). The errors Cruz complained of are mostly of constitutional 
significance, and were not properly cured at trial by the district court, and may have even· . 
been magnified by the court's untimely and ineffective curative instruction. See supra 
note 23 (discussing Morgan, 748 F.3d at 1040). Cumulatively, the errors influence the 
jury to find Cruz guilty. Accordingly, the cumulative effect of the errors should 
undermine the Court's confidence of a fair and impartial trial of Cruz. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Cruz urges this Court to reverse his convictions and 
remand for a new trial, or for further proceedings consistent with this Court's opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of June 2015. 
ISHOLA LAW GROUP, LLC. 
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USCS Const. Amend. 6 
Current through PL 114-25, approved 6/15/15 
United States Code Service - Constitution of the United States > CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AlVIERICA > AMENDMENTS > Al\tlENDl\tlENT 6 
Notice 
1• Part 1 of 8. You are viewing a very large document that has been divided into parts. 
R~ghts of the accused. 
---=--------· ----s•-giQIM3'_,_.,..=• ___ _,...,-,,sz:r..-;ic,.:w.., _..,...,.,--,,,,."""'~• 
In all criminal prosecutions, the. accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
UNITED STATES CODE SERVICE 
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a member of the LexisNexis Group TM 
All rights reserved. 
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Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 
Current through the 2014 General Session 
Utah Code Annotated > Constitution of Utah > Article I Declaration of Rights 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
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In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and def end in person and 
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation ag3:inst him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have 
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the 
defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule: 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 
Statutes current through the acts of the 2015 General Session signed through March 20, 
2015 
Utah Code Annotated > Title 76 Utah Criminal Code > Chapter 2 Principles of Criminal Responsibility 
> Part 1 Culpability Generally 
7 6-2-103. Definitions. 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or 
to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in 
the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or t~ circumstances 
smTounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result 
of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the 
result. 
(3) Recklessly with respect to circumstances sun-otmding his conduct or the result of his 
conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard 
of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed 
from the actor's standpoint. 
( 4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to circumstances 
smTotmding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will 
occur. The risk must be of a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it 
History 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-2-103 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would 
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
\J C. 1953, 76-2-103, enacted· by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 4; 2007, ch. 
229, § 4. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403.1 
Statutes current through the acts of the 2015 General Session signed through March 20, 
2015 
Utah Code Annotated > Title 76 Utah Criminal Code > Chapter 5 Offenses Against the Person 
> Part 4 Sexual Offenses 
76-5-403.1. Sodomy on a child. 
(1) A person commits sodomy upon a child if the actor engages in any sexual act upon or 
with a child who is under the age of 14, involving the genitals or anus of the actor or the 
child and the mouth or anus of either person, regardless of the sex of either participant. 
(2) Sodomy upon a child is a first degree felony punishable by a term of imprisonment 9f: 
(a) except as provided in Subsection (2)(b ), not less than 25 years and which may be 
for life; or 
(b) life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that: 
(i) during the course of the commission of the sodomy upon a child the defendant 
caused serious bodily injury to another; or 
(ii) at the time of the commission of the sodomy upon a child, the defendant was 
previously convicted of a grievous sexual offense. 
(3) Subsection (2)(b) does not apply if the defendant was younger than 18 years of age at 
the time of the offense. 
(4) Imprisonment under this section is mandatory in accordance with Section 76-3-406. 
History 
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C. 1953, 76-5-403.1, enacted by L. 1983, ch. 88, § 22; 1988, ch. 156, § 1; 1995, ch. 337, 
§ 7; 1995 (1st S.S.), ch. 10, § 8; 1996, ch. 40, § 9; 2007, ch. 339, § 17; 2008, ch. 179, 
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§ 5; ~013, ch. 81, § 9. 
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Rule 52. Findings by the court; correction of the record. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court 
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment 
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court 
shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds 
of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, 
shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the _close of the 
evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court 
need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided · 
in Rule 41 (b ). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is 
based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 14 days after entry of judgment 
the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment 
accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When 
findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the 
party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to such findings or has 
made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: · 
(c)(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(c)(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(c)(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(d) Correction of the record. If anything material is omitted from or misstated in the 
transcript of an audio or video record of a hearing or trial, or if a disagreement arises as to 
whether the record accurately discloses what occurred in the proceeding, a party may move to 
correct the record. The motion must be filed within 10 days after the transcript of the hearing is 
filed, unless good cause is shown. The omission, misstatement or disagreement shall be 
resolved by the court and the record made to accurately reflect the proceeding. 
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Rule 15.5.0ut of court statement and testimony of child victims or child witnesses of 
sexual or physical abuse - Conditions of admissibility. 
(a) In any case concerning a charge of child abuse or of a sexual offense against a child, the 
oral statement of a victim or other witness younger than 14 years of age which was recorded 
prior to the filing of an information or indictment is, upon motion and for good cause shown, 
admissible as evidence in any court proceeding regarding the offense if ·all of the following 
conditions are met: 
(a)(1) the child is available to testify and to be cross-examined at trial, either in person or as 
provided by law, or the child is unavailable to testify at trial, but the defendant had a previous 
opportunity to cross-examine the child concerning the recorded statement, such that the 
defendant's rights of confrontation are not violated; · 
(a)(2) no attorney for either party is in the child's presence when the statement is recorded; 
(a)(3) the recording is visual and aural and is recorded on film, videotape or other electronic 
means; 
(a)(4) the recording is accurate and has not been altered; 
(a)(5) each voice in the recording is identified; 
(a)(6) the person conducting the interview of the child in the recording is present at the 
proceeding and is available to testify and be cross-examined by either party;· 
(a){7) the defendant and his attorney are provided an opportunity to view the recording 
before it is shown to the court or jury; and 
(a)(8) the court views the recording before it is shown to the jury and determines that it is 
sufficiently reliable and trustworthy and that the interest of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence. 
(b) In a criminal case concerning a charge of child abuse or of a sexual offense against a 
child, the court, upon motion of a party and for good cause shown, may order that the testimony 
of any victim or other witness younger than 14 years of age be taken in a room other than the 
court room, and be televised by closed circuit equipment to be viewed by the jury in the court 
room. All of the following conditions shall be observed: 
(b )( 1) Only the judge, attorneys for each party and the testifying child (if any), persons 
necessary to operate equipment, and a counselor or therapist whose presence contributes to 
the welfare and emotional well-being of the child may be in the room. during the child's 
testimony. A defendant who consents to be hidden from the child's view may also be present 
unless the court determines that the child will suffer serious emotional or mental strain if 
required to testify in the defendant's presence, or that the child's testimony will be inherently 
unreliable if required to testify in the defendant's presence. If the court makes that 
determination, or if the defendant consents: 
(b )( 1 )(A) the defendant may not be present during the child's testimony; 
(b )(1 )(B) the court shall ensure that the child cannot hear or see the defendant; 
(b)(1 )(C) the court shall advise the child prior to his testimony that the defendant is present 
at the trial and may listen to the child's testimony; 
(b )(1 )(D) the defendant shall be permitted to observe and hear the child's testimony, and the 
court shall ensure that the defendant has a means of two-way telephonic communication with 
his attorney during the child's testimony; and 
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(b)(1 )(E) the conditions of a normal court proceeding shall be approximated as nearly as 
possible. 
(b )(2) Only the judge and an attorney for each party may question the child. 
(b )(3) As much as possible, persons operating the equipment shall ·be confined to an 
adjacent room or behind a screen or mirror so the child cannot see or hear them. 
(b)(4) If the defendant is present with the child during the child's testimony, the court may 
order that persons operating the closed circuit equipment film both the child and the defendant 
during the child's testimony, so that the jury may view both the child and the defendant, if that 
may be arranged without violating other requirements of Subsection (b)(1 ). 
(c) In any criminal case concerning a charge of child abuse or of a sexual offense against a 
child, the court may order, upon motion of a party and for good cause shown, that the testimony 
of any-victim or other witness younger than 14 years of age be taken outside the courtroom and 
be recorded. That testimony is admissible as evidence, for viewing in any court proceeding 
regarding the charges if the provisions of Subsection (b) are observed, in addition to the 
following provisions: 
(c)(1) the recording is visual and aural and recorded on film, videotape or by other electronic 
means; 
-..iJ (c)(2) the recording is accurate and is not altered; 
(c)(3) each voice on the recording is identified; and 
(c)(4) each party is given an opportunity to view the recording before it is shown in the 
courtroom~ 
(d) If the court orders that the testimony of a child be taken under Subsection (b) or (c), the 
child may not be required to testify in court at any proceeding where the recorded testimony is 
used. · 
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Rule 17. The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel. The 
defendant shall be personally present at the trial with the following exceptions: 
~ (1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent in writing to trial in his · . 
absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial 
after notice to defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or 
judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause shown which may include 
tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct. 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal attendance of the defendant a~ the 
trial . 
...iJ (b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order: 
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody; 
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and 
( 4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance. 
(c) Ali felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury in open court with the approval 
of the court and the consent of the prosecution. 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes written demand at least ten 
days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified in Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 
1953. 
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the accused and the approval of the 
court; by stipulation in writing or made orally in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in 
-..w> progress with any number of jurors less than otherwise required. 
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in the following order: 
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the defense may make an opening 
..;J statement or reserve it until the prosecution has rested; 
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; 
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case; 
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, for good cause, otherwise 
l.i) permits; 
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the court shall instruct the jury; and 
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides without argument, the 
prosecution shall open the argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution may close by responding 
to the defense argument. The court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each party 
and the time to be allowed for argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an alternate juror has been selected, the 
case shall proceed using the alternate juror. If no alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to 
proceed with the number of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged and a new trial 
ordered. 
(i) Questions by jurors. A judge may invite jurors to submit written questions to a witness as provided in 
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this section. 
(1) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall control the process to ensure the jury 
maintains its role as the impartial finder of fact and does not become an investigative body. The judge may 
disallow any question from a juror and may discontinue questions from jurors at any time. 
(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge should advise the jurors that they may write 
the question as it occurs to them and submit the question to the bailiff for transmittal to the judge. The 
judge should advise the jurors that some questions might not be allowed. 
(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and unrepresented parties and rule upon any objection 
to the question. The judge may disallow a question even though no objection is made. The judge shall 
preserve the written question in the court file. If the question is allowed, the judge shal_l ask the question or 
permit counsel or an unrepresented party to ask it. The question may be rephrased into proper form. The 
judge shall allow counsel and unrepresented parties to examine the witness after the juror's question. 
(j) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, or in which any other material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted 
in a body under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person 
appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, 
he will suffer no person other than the person so appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any 
subject connected with the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a specified 
time. · 
(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate or are sequestered, they shall 
be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or 
suffer themselves to be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their duty 
not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally submitted to them. 
(I) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits 
which have been received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the 
possession of the jury, such as exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The c~urt shall permit the 
jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled to take notes during the trial and to have those- notes 
with them during deliberations. As necessary, the court shall provide jurors with writing materials and 
instruct the jury on taking and using notes. 
(m) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together in some convenient place 
under charge of an officer until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by 
the court. Except by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow any 
communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask them if they have agreed upon 
their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their 
deliberations or the verdict agreed upon. 
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the 
cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. 
The court may then direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the defendant 
and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall 
be given. Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing 
without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and the response thereto shall 
be entered in the record. 
(o) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be corrected by the Jury under the. 
advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again. 
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court 
may issue an order dismissing any information or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that 
the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense. 
Advi~QL.Y- Committee Notes 
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Rule 30. Errors and defects. 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded. · 
~ (b) Cl'erical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the record arising from 
oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court 
may order. 
'vd 
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Rule 103. Rulings on Evidence 
(a) Preserving a Claim of Error. A party may claim error in a ruling to ~dmit or exclude 
evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the party and: 
(1) if the ruling admits evidence, a party, on the record: 
(A) timely objects or moves to strike; and 
(B) states the specific ground, unless it was apparent from the context; or 
(2) if the ruling excludes evidence, a party informs the court of its substance by an 
offer of proof, unless the substance was apparent from the context. 
(b) Not Needing to Renew an Objection or Offer of Proof. Once the court rules 
definitively on the record - either before or at trial - a party need not renew an objection 
or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal. 
(c) Court's Statement About the Ruling; Directing an Offer of Proof. The court may 
make any statement about the character or form of the evidence, the objection made, and 
the ruling. The court may direct that an offer of proof be made in question-and-answer form. 
{d) Preventing the Jury from Hearing Inadmissible Evidence. To the extent practicable, 
the court must conduct a jury trial so that inadmissible evidence is not suggested to the jury 
by any means. 
(e) Taking Notice of Plain Error. A court may take notice of a plain error affecting a 
substantial right, even if the claim of error was not properly preserved. 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as part of 
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style 
and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic 
only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility. This 
rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
~ This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. The 2001 amendment adopts changes made in 
Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) effective December 1, 2000. 
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1 interpreters in order to do so. 
2 I had asked Israel Gonzales if he was familiar or --
3 one, if they were familiar with how this had -- was handled. 
4 in other Courts; and Mr. Gonzales explained to me that in one 
5 other case that he's been involved in, the Judge actually 
6 allowed him to be in the jury room to provide the translation 
7 services, not to be part of the deliberations, but in order to 
8 facilitate their understanding of what the evidence was; but he 
9 swore a special oath as part of that, I believe. Either way, I 
10 wanted to raise the issue 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
12 MR. DRECHSEL: -- so people can think on that and not 
13 be surprised if that becomes an issue later on. 
14 THE COURT: Mr. Sidwell, do you want to make any record 
15 on that? 
16 MR. SIDWELL: Actually what I'd like to do, and I don't 
17 know if its right now or later, I would like to make a record 
18 -- and I know that you've already ruled on all these things 
19 that I'm going to talk about. I'd like to make a record of 
20 all my objections to -- for the whole -- all these 15.5 rules 
21 that we've done. 
22 I've thought about it. Over the last couple of months 
23 we've had several different hearings, and I think -- I'm not 
24 sure how well the record's been made, maybe because I haven't 
25 been articulating very well either, but I'd like to make a 
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record just for purposes of appeal so that it's clear of all 
of the different things that I've raised with regard to 15.5. 
The other thing that 
THE COURT: Well, and I'll just address that. I think 
I've addressed 15.5 to the extent that you've raised the issue. 
I've made my ruling, so I don't think any additional record is 
necessary on 15.5. 
MR. SIDWELL: Well, we don't -- let me tell you the 
reason why, is because I'm not the -- I'm not the attorney that 
does the appeals, and sometimes when I think that I'm making 
a very clear record of an issue, then I read the appeal and I 
can see that the appellate attorney didn't understand the issue 
that I was objecting to at all. So maybe I just didn't make 
it very clear; and I think that my clients have been -- in 
the past have had a disservice because maybe I didn't make 
the record clear enough, and because there's another attorney 
that has that maybe can't understand the way that I am 
thinking of these issues. 
THE COURT: So what are you saying you want to do? 
MR. SIDWELL: Well, I'll give you an ex -- well, for 
example, I objected to the DVD or the disk going back to the 
jury room, and you've already ruled on that; but I want to ~ake 
a record that because even to you maybe I didn't make it 
very clear -- is that we have different types of evidence. 
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1 We have testamentary type evidence that you make 
2 rulings on. You say that's admissible or not admissible; and 
3 we have demonstrative evidence to make rulings on, and you 
4 say it's admissible or not. On both types of evidence -- for 
5 example, tomorrow we're going to have -- you're going to make 
6 a ruling about whether my expert's going to be able to testify. 
7 That's testamentary. You're going to say -- you're going to 
8 make at least a doorkeeper decision about whether that person 
9 testifies. That's testamentary. 
10 Just because we say something is admissible doesn't 
11 mean that it's going to be in a demonstrative form. So my 
12 argument was -- this is and I think this is more clear for 
13 the record -- is that that I'm saying just because the rule 
14 says that the girl's testimony is admissible, it doesn't mean 
15 that it necessarily gets to be demonstrative. 
16 So when we say if a person goes -- if we go through 
17 all the steps of 15.5, the rule does not specify whether that's 
18 testimonial or demonstrative. My argument is that it should 
19 only be testimonial. 
20 THE COURT: So you would argue that the jury would not 
21 be allowed to consider the videotape in its deliberations in 
22 the jury room? 
23 MR. SIDWELL: Correct, and you have already made a 
24 ruling, but I just wanted to clarify that --
25 THE COURT~ Okay. 
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MR. SIDWELL: --so that the record's clear that if they 
do choose to make an appeal, they understand what my argument 
was. The other thing-- my other thing, just to make the record 
clear, my argument for that was because it goes to the idea-of 
due process, because we cannot, based on the way we do it, if I 
-- if I have a cross examination of the child, my cross exami-
nation doesn't get to go to the jury room. 
So as a matter of due process and fairness, it's 
only fair that it should be only testimonial evidence and not 
demonstrative. My argument was Rule 15.5 doesn't specify one 
way or the other. 
you've 
clear. 
THE COURT: Okay, I understand your argument. 
MR. SIDWELL: Right. 
THE COURT: Do you want to 
MR. SIDWELL: I'm not sure that you need to make a --
already ruled, and so --
THE COURT: Did I already rule on that issue? 
MR. SIDWELL: You already ruled. 
THE COURT: Okay, then I'm not --
MR. SIDWELL: I'm just making the rule -- the record 
MR. DRECHSEL: If I could just flesh it out. 
THE COURT: I'll let the State make its record. 
MR. DRECHSEL: Well, these issues were discussed and 
addressed with the Court, and the Court made decisions on these 
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surrendering your individual judgment. 
Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do 
so only after impartially considering the evidence with your 
fellow jurors. Do not hesitate to reexamine your own -- do not 
hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your position 
if you are convinced it is mistaken; but do not surrender your 
honest conviction as to the weight or affect of the evidence 
solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or just to 
return a verdict. You are judges, judges of the facts. Your 
sole interest is to determine the truth from the evidence in 
the case. 
I now ask you to take the following two questions back 
with you into the jury room and discuss them as a group. I do 
not want any of you to indicate your answer now. Only answer 
after you have discussed it as a group. Question one, "Have 
you reached a unanimous verdict on any of the Counts I through 
VIII?" Question two, "Is there nay reasonable likelihood that 
that continued deliberation will result in a unanimous verdict 
on any counts that you have not yet as a group been able to 
unanimously agree upon?Q 
I'll ask you to talk about these questions, get back 
with me in a relatively short period of time to let us know 
where you are in this matter, because that's what I think is 
appropriate, okay? I'm going to give this instruction to the 
bailiff to put with the other ones, okay? So let us know when 
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the defendant told her not to tell anyone about the activity 
that had occurred. He had told her not to bite his penis, but 
rather to suck his penis like a popsicle. 
Some of the linear things that came in a logical 
sequence was how her pants and underwear were pulled down 
partially when some of these events occurred, which would be 
consistent with how it would reasonably or one would expect it 
would happen in the way that she described. 
I also believe that her testimony was is that at least 
one of these events occurred within a short period of time of 
the time that she gave the interview. That goes to the trust-
worthiness and the reliability that it was closer in time than 
what we would get after sometime later, and it also goes to the 
point that it would be in the interest of justice that that 
testimony would be heard by the jury from the video because it 
was closer in time and likely more reflective of what was in 
the child's mind. 
That is some of the analysis that Justice Parish used 
in the Nguyen the policy in the Nguyen case that supported 
the reason that we didn't need to make a finding of good cause 
in addition to the eight factors, is that there's a strong 
public policy in the State to allow children to not be trauma-
tized by a sec -- by additional inquiry into the allegations or 
the events; and also because it's more likely that we will get 
better information from a child witness from the interview than 
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we would in a Court setting. That was a policy reason advocated 
by -- or identified by Justice Parish. 
I'll note the child did not appear to make grandiose 
or exaggerated or very bizarre or estranged statements of what 
the facts -- she believed the facts were. There are some cases 
where the victim or alleged victim would make some statements 
that are so difficult in the common sense to believe or under-
stand, that Courts have found that those were not reliable. 
She didn't make any statements like that. 
I didn't find any indication that there was any 
coaching or attempts to have the child repeat things from 
any other source. I didn't get any sense of that. So on 
that basis I believe her testimony is sufficiently reliable 
and trustworthy. 
I believe it's in the interest of justice for the 
policy reasons that were identified by Justice Parish. I do 
not believe it's in the interest of child -- alleged child 
victims to be subjected to additional examination, or as the 
least amount of reasonable examination that's possible, as well 
as I believe that the potential to receive better information 
from the child will be provided through the video than through 
direct examination later sometime later after the fact than in 
a setting that is likely to be more difficult, traumatic and 
stressful for the child. 
So those are my findings as to why -- and I will tell 
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1 THE COURT: You can step down if you'd like. 
2 MR. SIDWELL: So are we -- we're going to play the 
3 video now? 
4 THE COURT: Yes. 
5 MR. ·SIDWELL: Okay, so I think this would be a time 
6 where you could tell the jury what we talked about prior about 
7 the (inaudible). 
8 THE COURT: Right, I'm going to do that. 
9 THE WITNESS: Am I to stay in the courtroom during the 
10 video? 
11 THE COURT: No. Well, actually --
12 MR. DRECHSEL: I think he should be here, because he's 
13 the witness that --
14 THE COURT: I think that you probably should stay and 
15 watch the video, because if they ask you questions it may be 
16 about specific things in the video. 
17 THE WITNESS: Right. 
18 THE COURT: So I think you need to be here. 
19 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
20 MR. DRECHSEL: But he doesn't have to remain on the 
21 stand. 
22 THE COURT: No, I don't want you to stay on the stand. 
23 Let me give you-- I'm going to give the jury some instructions. 
24 When we broke just before lunch, we had talked about -- there 
25 had been an issue arise where Mr. Drechsel for the State had 
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asked me to take -- make a record of the actions of the child 
in response to some questions. 
Upon further reflection, I believe that that was not 
something I should have done. I don't want you to consider my 
statement about the child moving her head up and down for any 
purpose. You can evaluate for yourself whether or not 'the 
child did anything and what purpose you are going to apply if 
any to her conduct in response to that question. That's not 
a question that I should have -- that's not an issue that I 
should have made a statement as to, okay? So disregard that 
completely. Consider only what you saw on the video, okay? 
Is that -- any more that you want me to include, Counsel? 
MR. DRECHSEL: No, that's fine. 
MR. SIDWELL: Just that when we watch this video, what-
ever -- it's whatever they see is what they see, and they're 
the judges. 
THE COURT: Well, I am not going to make a record on 
what you observe. You are the record makers. You are the 
finders of fact. So whatever you observe from the video is 
your own observation and you can draw your own conclusions from 
that. Mr. Perry wants to ask me a question. That's typically 
not something we allow to have happen. Just so you understand, 
the attorneys are responsible to present the evidence here. If 
there are questions about things that you may all have, you're 
not going to get an opportunity to ask those. You're going to 
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